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Abstract
Within the last five years, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand have joined the ranks of the
United Kingdom and other countries in issuing government bonds that are indexed to
inflation. Some observers of the experience in these countries have argued that the United
States should follow suit. This paper provides an overview of the issues surrounding debt
indexation, and it tries to answer three empirical questions about indexed debt. First, how
different would the returns on indexed bonds be from the returns on existing US debt
instruments? Second, how would indexed bonds affect the government’s average financing
costs? Third, how might the Federal Reserve be able to use the information contained in
the prices of indexed bonds to help formulate monetary policy? The paper concludes with
a more speculative discussion of the possible consequences of increased use of indexed debt
contracts by the private sector.

1. Introduction
It is natural for the principal and interest payments specified by debt contracts to be
denominated in real rather than nominal terms. Payments are naturally made in terms that
are meaningful to the parties to the contract, rather than in terms of money whose value,
especially over long periods of time, may be very unpredictable. Government debt securities
— bills, notes and bonds — that specify real payments are known as indexed or index-linked
debt, since their nominal payments are linked to the value of an official price index.

This paper was prepared for the NBER Macroeconomics Annual Conference, March 8–9, 1996.
The authors are indebted to John Ammer, Norman Carleton, David Mullins, Julio Rotemberg, and
David Wilcox for discussions; to David Barr, Creon Butler, and Mervyn King for assistance with the
UK data and discussions about the UK experience; and to Andres Lederman, Michael Rashes, and
Luis Viceira for able research assistance.

1

The issuance of indexed debt is not a new idea; it was proposed and implemented long
ago. In 1780, the State of Massachusetts created indexed debt (Fisher, 1913). The notes
specified “Both Principal and Interest to be paid in the then current Money of said State, in
a greater or less Sum, according as Five Bushels of CORN, Sixty-eight Pounds and fourseventh Parts of a Pound of BEEF, Ten Pounds of SHEEP’S WOOL, and Sixteen Pounds
of SOLE LEATHER shall then cost, more or less than One Hundred Thirty Pounds current
money, at the then current Prices of Said Articles.”1 Despite the limited number of
commodities that they saw fit to include in their formula, and without using the word “index
number,” they indeed created indexed debt just as we define it today.
In 1822, Joseph Lowe advocated for the first time a public policy that long-term
contracts should generally be settled in terms of an index number, a “tabular standard,” that
is based on a “table comprising articles of general consumption to each of which is affixed
the probable amount of money expended on it by the public.” His appears to be the first
clear public advocacy of the idea that indexed debt should be the rule rather than the
exception.2 His ideas were taken up by many others in the 19th century, notably Jevons
(1875), who even argued that the use of indexed debt in private contracts “might be made
compulsory, in the sense that every money debt of, say, more than three months’ standing,
would be varied according to the tabular standard, in the absence of an express provision to
the contrary.”3
The cause of indexed debt has been taken up by many people since. The idea appears
to make elementary common sense: there would seem to be little point in defining long-term
contracts in terms of currency or precious metals whose value in terms of consumption
goods may be very unstable. Yet the adoption of such debt by governments has been
painfully slow. Even today, the governments of most of the major countries of the world
have no indexed debt.
There are today, however, some grounds for optimism that indexed debt is growing in
1

This text is from a plate (Fisher 1913, facing page 454), with a photograph of a four-year
indexed note allegedly engraved by Paul Revere. The notes were issued at a difficult time during the
Revolutionary War when the paper currency was very unstable. After the war, in 1786, at a time of
intense public discontent about economic injustices, culminating in Shay’s Rebellion, the remaining
indexed debt was consolidated into non-indexed debt.
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At least he is thought to be the first to propose indexing of contracts by Jevons (1875) and Fisher
(1934).
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Jevons (1875), p. 324. Jevons tried to anticipate difficulties with the scheme but could think of
only a few minor ones. “It would, no doubt, introduce a certain complexity into the relations of
debtors and creditors, and disputes might sometimes arise” (p. 324), but he doubted that this was a
serious problem. He concluded that “The only serious difficulty which I foresee, is that of deciding
upon the proper method of deducing the average [index].”
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importance. There appears to be a new momentum towards the introduction of indexed
bonds. Table 1 shows the dates of introduction of government bonds, indexed to consumer
or wholesale prices, in various countries of the world.4 Three countries, Canada, Sweden
and New Zealand, have introduced indexed government bonds in the past five years. Note
also from this table that the recent introductions of indexed debt have occurred in countries
with fairly low inflation rates comparable to recent inflation rates in the United States.
Table 2 shows statistics on the importance of some of the indexed bond markets as of
mid-1995. We see from these numbers that indexed bond markets are of some consequence.
In Israel, indexed debt is the dominant form of government debt, reflecting a history that
includes episodes of extremely high inflation. Israel has issued $25 billion of indexed
bonds, over 85% of total Israeli marketable debt. The UK also has issued large quantities
of indexed debt. Although indexed bonds are only 15% of total UK marketable debt, the
size of UK government borrowing makes the UK indexed bond market by far the most
prominent in the world, with $57 billion outstanding and an average daily turnover of over
$250 million in 1994. In all of these countries except New Zealand (the most recent issuer
of indexed bonds) the indexed bonds account for more than 1% of the national debt, and in
all but the most recently introduced markets, New Zealand and Sweden, the turnover in
these markets is substantial.
There is a history of serious interest in indexed bonds within the government of the
United States, although this has never resulted in any actual issuance of government indexed
bonds. Until recently, the most visible interest in creating indexed bonds came from the US
Congress. Legislation mandating the issuance of indexed Treasury securities was introduced
in 1985 by Senator Dan Quayle (S. 1088) and Congressman Daniel Lungren (H.R. 1773).
This legislation received widespread support in testimony at hearings, although the bill
suffered opposition from officials of the US Treasury. Lungren introduced his legislation
again in 1987 (H.R. 1330). In 1992, John Conyers, then Chairman of the House Committee
on Government Operations, submitted to Congress a report on indexed debt that argued that

4

The table does not consider other forms of indexed bonds whose payments are linked to a
foreign currency or to the price of a precious metal. Such bonds are not equivalent to price-indexed
bonds, since there may be fluctuations in the real prices of foreign currencies or precious metals.
There are, however, potential advantages to these other forms of indexation, particularly for small
open economies. Foreign investors may hold a substantial fraction of the debt, and they may prefer
foreign-currency debt to price-indexed debt. Moreover, when inflation reaches extreme levels in a
small open economy a foreign currency tends to replace the domestic currency in daily transactions.
However, these arguments for other forms of indexation do not apply well to the United States.
Some of the issues of indexed bonds shown in the table (with dates we took from Page and
Trollope (1974) and Jud (1978)) might have been for small amounts, and not of much importance.
Diligent library work produced no confirming evidence of some of the earlier indexation dates.
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government issuance of indexed debt would “contribute generally to economic efficiency,
productivity, stability, and equity.”5
More recently, the interest in indexed bonds has come from within the Clinton
Administration. Darcy Bradbury, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, has
repeatedly stated to the press since August 1994 that the Treasury is considering issuing
indexed bonds, although no decision is imminent. The 1995 Economic Report of the
President contains what seems to be cautious support for issuance of indexed bonds.6 Laura
Tyson, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, made similar statements in
1995. The US Treasury apparently has the authority to begin issuing indexed bonds without
any congressional approval, but the decision whether to do so is something that would be
left to the Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Rubin, who has apparently made no public
statement on the issue.7 These statements from members of the Clinton administration,
coupled with the recent tendency of other countries to issue indexed bonds, make it appear
that such issuance may be closer to reality in the US now than at any other time since 1780.
However, the intense recent election-year discussion of the federal budget, culminating in
the recent shutdown of the US government, has probably deflected the attention of national
leaders from the issue of indexed bonds. We may hope that they will return to the matter
in due course.
Since there are a number of questions that arise in any serious consideration of indexed
bonds, it is important at this time to review them, and give a sort of scoring of the pros and
cons for indexed debt. The next section of this paper gives an overview of the issues, and
we then consider three important empirical topics.
First, we consider an argument against indexed debt, that it is not really much different
from something that we already have, namely, short-term debt. Short-term Treasury bills
offer a considerable degree of inflation protection, since their rates adjust rapidly to changes
in expected future inflation. An investor who wants inflation protection can roll over
Treasury bills; but this investor is exposed to the risk of fluctuations in real interest rates.
We will show evidence on the difference between indexed bond returns and the returns on
nominal bills and bonds that are already issued by the US Treasury.
5

US Congress, Committee on Government Operations (1992), p. 15.
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“More direct and reliable readings of inflation expectations would be provided if one could
compare rates of return on bonds whose yields are invariant to inflation with yields on conventional
bonds (Box 2–5). Such inflation-indexed bonds have been issued in other countries, but not in the
United States, and valuable information about inflation expectations has been obtained from their
yields.” Economic Report of the President, 1995, page 87.
7

There is a potential problem with the national debt ceiling, which is defined in terms of the face
value of the debt; with indexed debt the value of the principal is not predetermined.
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Second, we consider an argument for indexed debt, that it might lower the Treasury’s
average financing costs. Since nominal bonds expose investors to inflation risk, their yields
presumably contain an inflation risk premium. If the Treasury issues indexed bonds it can
expect to save this premium, but there is surprisingly little work on the magnitude of the
inflation risk premium. It is not even clear that the introduction of indexed debt would
reduce borrowing costs at all. In theory, the inflation risk premium could be negative.
Moreover, some Treasury officials have argued that indexed bond issuance would
“balkanize” the market and reduce the liquidity of all government debt, thereby raising
borrowing costs. We will provide estimates of the inflation risk premium under various
assumptions, and will consider the balkanization and other issues related to borrowing costs.
Third, we consider the argument for indexed bonds that they may have some
informational value because they make it easier for the monetary authority and other
observers to impute the inflation expectations of bond-market investors. We will show
evidence on how well existing nominal bond yields forecast inflation. Moreover, we will
consider how indexed bonds have helped the monetary authority formulate policy in the UK
and other countries with liquid indexed bond markets.
The conclusion of the paper considers the argument that the creation of a substantial
government indexed bonds market might have a “demonstration effect,” encouraging the
indexation of private contracts. We discuss what private use of indexation might develop,
and what might be the effects on economic welfare.

2. What Are the Issues?
Much of the political discussion of indexed debt emphasizes the consequences of
indexation for average government borrowing costs. At the time of the 1985 hearings on
the proposal for Treasury indexed debt, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
expressed an often-stated concern: whether the issuance of such debt would really save the
taxpayer money. He stated that “the real question with respect to whether indexed debt will
save the taxpayer money really gets down to an evaluation of the size and persistence of the
so-called inflation risk premium that is associated with the level of nominal interest rates.” 8
At the same hearing, Under Secretary of the Treasury Jerome Powell argued that the
securities would have to pay a high interest rate so as to attract taxable investors, and thus
they might be an expensive source of government finance. He argued that the issue of
securities aimed at a small segment of the market could “balkanize” the market, reducing

8

“Inflation Indexing of Government Securities,” a hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade,
Productivity, and Economic Growth of the Joint Economic Committee, May 14, 1985, p. 28.
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liquidity and increasing borrowing costs. He stated “We believe that the threshold question
on indexed bond issuance is whether they would be a cost-effective instrument for meeting
the borrowing requirements of the US government.”9
In this paper, we do try to estimate the likely effects of debt indexation on average
government borrowing costs. But we do not agree that the analysis of debt management is
primarily a question of comparing the average interest costs to the government of different
types of debt.
A single-minded emphasis on average interest costs is inappropriate for several reasons.
First, interest costs are not real resource costs to society like the costs of the human
resources used in other government activities, since the interest is really just a transfer
between people. When the debt is domestic, the only direct effects of higher financing costs
are higher transfers from taxpayers to bondholders who share the same government.
To illustrate this point, consider what happens when all government debt is nominal (not
indexed), and inflation is lower than expected. Then the government is forced to make
relatively large real payments on its nominal debt. The government in this situation is
“losing” on the financing of its nominal debt, and it would be paying out less if it had used
indexed debt. But of course the government is not a person, and we should not think of the
government as losing money; we should think of what the situation means for real people.
If the government uses taxes to make the payments on the debt, then the taxes will exactly
equal the high real income that a person holding the average per capita amount of debt
obtains. There is no effect of the government’s high financing costs on the average person.
Those individuals who hold (directly or indirectly) large amounts of government debt will
gain at the expense of those who hold little government debt. Exactly the opposite occurs
when inflation is higher than expected.
Some economists have argued on the basis of this logic that the form of government
financing has no real effects at all. By analogy with the famous Modigliani–Miller Theorem
in corporate finance, this is sometimes called a Modigliani-Miller theorem for government
finance.10 Of course, this proposition holds only under extremely restrictive assumptions,
including most importantly the assumption that the government has nondistortionary sources
of tax revenue. When the government must rely on distortionary taxation, then payments
by taxpayers to bondholders involve deadweight losses.
Even in the presence of distortionary taxation, however, the government should not try
to minimize its average borrowing costs. In efficient financial markets higher average

9

Hearings, p. 104. The Congressional Budget Office (1993) also emphasizes the effect of debt
management on average interest costs.
10

Sill (1994) is an accessible introduction to this idea. See also Wallace (1981).
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returns (or lower average borrowing costs) can only be achieved by taking on more risk (or
transferring less risk to investors). If the government really wanted to minimize its average
financing costs it could borrow at the Treasury bill rate and invest the proceeds in the stock
market. Such a financing strategy would earn the government the equity premium, but the
risk would be unacceptably high. This illustrates the point that borrowing costs must be
considered in relation to risk.
If average borrowing costs are not the key issue, what considerations are important for
an assessment of indexed debt? There are several reasons to believe that creating indexed
debt will have real effects: 1) creating indexed bonds may reduce the expected deadweight
losses of distortionary taxation, 2) creating indexed bonds may affect incentives for the
government to contain inflation, 3) creating indexed bonds may enable the market to provide
important kinds of new information, and 4) creating indexed bonds may help people with
different risk tolerances to share their risks better. Of these four effects, the first three can
be considered from the standpoint of representative individual, as if all people are the same,
while the fourth depends on heterogeneity across people. Let us consider these four effects
in turn.
1. Effects on Tax Distortions. As Barro (1995) has emphasized, an important
consideration in deciding the structure of government debt is that the distortionary effects
of taxation should be spread as evenly as possible over time and across states of nature. This
is the appropriate way for a government relying on distortionary taxation to trade off the risk
and return of alternative financing strategies.
With nominal debt, changes in the price level can cause changes in the real debt
payments that must be financed by taxes. Barro argues that in ideal economies where there
are no random fluctuations in government financing needs as would be caused by wars or
other exigencies, the ideal form of government debt would be indexed consols, since even
when inflation is uncertain these consols provide a uniform and perpetual stream of real
payments, a stream of real payments that is maximally smoothed.11
2. Incentive Effects on the Government. The inflation rate itself is not exogenous but
is the outcome of a political process. Indexed debt financing can matter if it changes the
incentives for the government to create or tolerate inflation. Economists have identified a
variety of mechanisms by which this may occur. Most obviously, the use of indexed debt
removes the incentive for the government to erode the real value of its obligations by

11

See Barro (1995). There are some potential arguments for nominal debt based on the possibility
that inflation shocks are related to real shocks that individuals face, so that nominal debt can serve
as an insurance medium that cushions the effects of these real shocks; see Bohn (1988). If the
relation between inflation shocks and real shocks is not reliable, however, it would be better to insure
directly against the real shocks; see Shiller (1993).
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creating inflation. Along these lines, Margaret Thatcher argued that index-linked gilts (UK
a situation in which the government would have to face a large interest expense if it ever
allowed inflation to pick up.12 On the other hand, the use of indexed debt reduces the
political opposition to inflation of government bondholders, which may be a moderating
influence on inflation in some countries.
3. Effects on Public Information. Possibly more relevant in the United States and
other countries with moderate debt burdens and inflation rates, the existence of both
nominal and indexed debt gives the monetary authority a measure of market expectations
of future inflation. This can be used to fend off political pressure for excessively
expansionary monetary policy during periods of temporarily low inflation. At such times
the media and politicians have a tendency to proclaim that “inflation is dead” and to push
for monetary stimulus of the economy; in resisting such arguments the monetary authority
may find that market-based forecasts of inflation are more effective than econometric
forecasts generated by its own staff economists.
4. Effects on Risk Sharing Among Heterogeneous Individuals. From the standpoint
of theoretical finance, the creation of government indexed debt may fill an important gap.
If the existence of government indexed debt has a demonstration effect that encourages
private issuance of indexed debt as well, then a liquid market for riskfree real debt may
develop, giving society a true “riskfree interest rate.”
Creating a liquid market for indexed debt of course does not eliminate the fundamental
risk that society faces, the risk that the economy will or will not be as productive as
expected. We cannot all just invest in the riskfree rate and thereby all be completely
insulated from real risk; somebody has to bear the residual risk. But riskless debt does
provide a mechanism by which society can offer a riskless income to some people. If there
is a market for riskless debt, then one would expect it to be priced in such a way that the
expected riskless income from investing in these assets is lower than the income one could
obtain if one accepted some risk, so that only the more risk averse people will choose to live
with the lower income stream.
In other words, a riskfree real asset plays a central role in the risk-sharing arrangements
of an ideal economy. According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, relatively risk averse
investors would hold investments in the riskfree asset and the market portfolio, while less
risk-averse investors would short the riskfree asset and buy more of the market portfolio.
The result of creating the riskfree asset can be a more efficient allocation of risk. In some
theoretical formulations, the creation of the riskfree asset is of truly fundamental

12

See Steve Hanke and Alan Walters, “Sleeping Policeman,” Forbes, May 9, 1994, p. 217.
Missale and Blanchard (1994) present a simple model of this effect.
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significance. Shubik and Geanakoplos (1990) have shown that under certain idealized
assumptions, the creation of a single market, the market for the riskfree asset will achieve
full Pareto optimality even when markets are very incomplete. Even under less restrictive
assumptions than are in place in their model, we would expect important welfare gains from
the creation of a riskfree real asset.
This effect of the creation of indexed debt relies on there being differences across
people in their concerns about risk. Some may doubt that such heterogeneity is important.
For example, Barsky et al. (1995) use survey data to study individual differences in risk
tolerance and relate them to differences in economic behavior; they find only rather small
differences in risk tolerance that are confirmed by differences in economic behavior. But
there certainly are differences across people, even if not captured by the methods of Barsky
et al. that would imply that some people are very vulnerable to income fluctuations. For
example, low-income retired people, or people who find it difficult to understand the issues
of investing in risky assets whose prospects are very hard to define, may be more risk
averse, and these people may benefit from the existence of indexed bonds. They would
benefit just as some people today benefit from savings and insurance institutions that protect
them from various uncertainties.

3. How Different Are Indexed Bonds?
In the US, short-term nominal bonds are similar to short-term indexed bonds, because,
in most of US history, there has been little inflation uncertainty at a horizon of a month or
two. Long-term nominal bond returns are primarily driven by news about future inflation,
but this is not the case for short-term nominal bonds (Campbell and Ammer 1993). In fact,
it is common in empirical finance to use the return on a nominal US Treasury bill as a proxy
for the return on a riskless real asset. Hence, some argue, there is really no need to issue
indexed government bonds because we already have short-term instruments for which
inflation risk is small; the riskless real asset that is needed for effective risk-sharing already
exists.
Many investors, however, have longer horizons than one or two months. An investor
seeking an asset that is riskless in real terms at a long horizon can roll over short-term
nominal debt, but the returns on this rollover strategy are risky because they are exposed to
variations in real interest rates.
Long-term indexed bonds are different from short-term nominal or indexed bonds,
because they respond differently to real interest rate shocks. Over a horizon of one month,
a shock to expected future real interest rates will cause a capital loss on a long-term indexed
bond (say, a 10-year zero-coupon indexed bond) but will not affect the return on a one9

month Treasury bill or indexed bill. Over a horizon of 10 years, the return on a 10-year
indexed bond is known in advance and will not be affected by real interest rate variation
whereas the return on rolling over Treasury bills or indexed bills will be sensitive to real
interest rates.
In judging the importance of indexed debt, it is vital to know how large is this difference
between short-term debt and long-term indexed bonds. To address this question, we explore
the historical evidence in several different ways.
3.1. Hypothetical Indexed Bonds in the United States
In the US, of course, indexed debt has not been issued in modern times. This makes it
hard to know how indexed bond prices might have behaved if they had been quoted. To
circumvent this difficulty, our first approach is to assume that expected real returns on
indexed bonds of all maturities equal the expected real returns on short-term nominal
Treasury bills plus a constant.13 That is, we assume that the rational expectations hypothesis
of the term structure would hold for indexed bonds, and that the inflation risk premium in
short-term nominal bills is constant.
Note that we do not need to assume that the expectations hypothesis describes nominal
bonds. Our earlier work has presented evidence against the expectations hypothesis in the
nominal term structure (Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz 1983, Campbell and Shiller
1991), although we have also found that nominal bond yields move closely with those
predicted by the expectations hypothesis (Shiller 1972, Modigliani and Shiller 1973,
Campbell and Shiller 1991). Barr and Campbell (1995) find little evidence against the
expectations hypothesis in the term structure of UK indexed bond yields. The assumption
of a constant inflation risk premium is harder to assess; we are disregarding the possibility
that the inflation risk premium might vary systematically in response to the quantity of
indexed bonds sold by the government, or that the inflation risk premium might change
through time as the market for indexed bonds becomes deeper and more liquid, or that the
inflation risk premium might change through time as the public becomes more familiar with
indexed bonds, or just that the amount of inflation uncertainty might change through time.
Given these assumptions we can use an econometric model to estimate what the
movements of the indexed yield curve would have been in historical US data. Specifically,
we proceed as follows:

13

With all of our results reported here, returns are measured as the natural log of one plus the
conventionally-defined return. This log transformation of returns is common in the empirical finance
literature. It has little effect on our results, since our returns tend to be small numbers.
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a. We take data on 3-month US Treasury bill rates and CPI inflation, and construct the ex
post quarterly log real bill return.
b. We regress this return onto a set of forecasting variables. The fitted value of this
regression is an estimate of the ex ante quarterly real interest rate. Our basic set of
forecasting variables includes the lagged real bill return, the nominal bill yield at the
start of the quarter, and the lagged inflation rate over the previous year; we have also
considered an augmented set of variables that includes the 5-year nominal bond yield
at the start of the quarter.
c. We include all these variables in a VAR system to calculate multi-period forecasts of
the ex ante quarterly real interest rate. We vary the lag length of the VAR system to
make sure that our results are robust to the choice of lag length; we consider 1-lag and
4-lag versions of the system.
d. We assume that the expectations hypothesis of the term structure describes log indexed
bond yields, and calculate yields on hypothetical zero-coupon indexed bonds from the
regression forecasts of the ex ante quarterly real interest rate. The fitted yield on a
hypothetical indexed 3-month bill is just the 1-quarter forecast from the model, whereas
the fitted yield on a hypothetical indexed 10-year zero-coupon bond is a simple average
of these forecasts over the next 40 quarters.
This procedure ignores differences in expected returns between nominal bills and
indexed bonds, arising from inflation risk premia or risk premia in the real term
structure of interest rates. If these risk premia are constant but not zero, our procedure
will correctly fit the movements of the indexed yield curve but will not correctly
measure the average level of the indexed yield curve. Accordingly we use our fitted
yields to describe second moments but not first moments of hypothetical indexed bond
returns.
e. We use our fitted indexed bond yields to calculate indexed log bond returns at short and
long horizons and compare them with the returns on nominal and hypothetical indexed
Treasury bills rolled over to the same horizons. If ykt is the yield on a k-year indexed
bond, for example, the 1-quarter return on the bond is just (4k)ykt – (4k – 1)yk–1,t+1. We
compare this with the 1-quarter real return on a nominal 3-month Treasury bill and on
a hypothetical indexed 3-month bill. At a horizon of k years, we compare ykt with the
k-year return on rolled-over nominal 3-month Treasury bills and on rolled-over
hypothetical indexed 3-month bills.
We illustrate the results of this exercise in Figures 1 and 2, which are derived from the
basic 1-lag VAR system. Figure 1 shows the ex post quarterly real return on nominal 3month Treasury bills (the solid line), along with the VAR forecast of this return which is our
11

fitted yield on a hypothetical 3-month indexed bill (the dashed line). Figure 2 shows the real
yields on hypothetical indexed bonds of maturities 1 year (the solid line), 2 years (the longdashed line), 5 years (the dotted line), and 10 years (the short-dashed line). These figures
are intended to illustrate the movements of hypothetical indexed bond yields, rather than
their average levels which are not identified if risk premia are nonzero.
Figure 1 shows the familiar history of quarterly US real interest rates over the past 40
years. After a period of low real interest rates in the late 1950s, real rates were
comparatively stable between 1% and 2% until the mid-1970s, when they were negative or
close to zero for several years. Around 1980 there was a dramatic increase in the real
interest rate to almost 6%, followed by a gradual decline (briefly interrupted in the late
1980s) to levels close to zero in the early 1990s. Figure 2 shows a similar but considerably
dampened pattern in the movements of longer-term indexed bond yields. The 10-year
indexed bond yield, for example, hardly declines at all in the 1970s and rises by less than
2 percentage points in 1980–81. This behavior is what one would expect if much of the
variation in the short-term real interest rate is transitory.
Table 3 reports summary statistics comparing the behavior of nominal 3-month Treasury
bills with hypothetical indexed 3-month Treasury bills and hypothetical indexed bonds of
maturities 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, and 10 years. The basic VAR system is estimated with
1 or 4 lags over the full sample period 1953–94, and with 1 lag over the subsamples
1953–73 and 1974–94. For each specification of the system, the table reports a set of
standard deviations. The table does not show any means because our methodology for
estimating hypothetical indexed bond yields identifies only the variation of these yields and
not their average level.
The first three columns in Table 3 study the behavior of returns at a 3-month horizon.
The first column gives the unconditional standard deviation of the yield on a hypothetical
indexed 3-month bill. Under the assumptions we have made, this yield is the rational
expectation of the real return on a nominal 3-month bill, and on a hypothetical indexed longterm bond held for 1 quarter. The second column gives the standard deviation of the
unexpected real return on a nominal 3-month bill (the difference between the real return on
the bill and the yield on a hypothetical indexed bill), while the third column gives the
standard deviation of the unexpected real return on a hypothetical indexed long-term bond
(the difference between the real bond return and the yield on a hypothetical indexed bill).
All yields and returns are reported in percentage points, on an annualized basis, to match the
convention for reporting nominal yields on Treasury bills, notes, and bonds. Since we are
using log yields and returns, the numbers in annualized percentage points are just 400 times
the numbers in natural units.
The table shows that there is some inflation risk in holding nominal 3-month bills.
12

Column (2) of the table shows that over the full sample period the standard deviation of the
unexpected quarterly real return on these bills is about 2 percentage points on an annualized
basis, or 50 basis points per quarter. This inflation risk could be entirely avoided if indexed
Treasury bills were available, as indexed bills would have a known real quarterly return at
the start of each quarter. (The standard deviation in column (1) of Table 3, which is also
close to 2 percentage points annualized, represents unconditional variation in this expected
return, not risk as measured at the start of each quarter.)
Hypothetical indexed long-term bonds also appear risky on a quarterly basis, because
their returns are affected by quarterly news about future real interest rates. Column (3)
shows that the standard deviation of the unexpected annualized quarterly real return on a 1year indexed bond is 1.7 percentage points in the 1-lag VAR model (1.0 percentage point
in the 4-lag model), and this rises to 6.6 percentage points (7.4 percentage points) for a 10year indexed bond.
There is of course no uncertainty about the real return on a long-term indexed bond if
it is held to maturity, for its real return will then equal its yield. Column (4) of Table 3
shows the unconditional standard deviation of this yield for 1, 2, 5, and 10-year hypothetical
indexed bonds. Like the numbers in column (1), these numbers represent unconditional
variation rather than risk from the perspective of an investor. As one would expect, the
variability of indexed bond yields declines with maturity, from 1.2 percentage points for a
1-year bond in the 1-lag model (1.4 percentage points in the 4-lag model) to 0.4 percentage
points (0.9 percentage points) for a 10-year bond.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 report the standard deviations of unexpected annualized
percentage returns on nominal 3-month Treasury bills and hypothetical indexed 3-month
Treasury bills, respectively, rolled over for 1, 2, 5, or 10 years. Hypothetical indexed bills
have return uncertainty of 60 to 100 basis points per year, depending on the investment
horizon and VAR lag length, while nominal bills have return uncertainty of 120 basis points
per year or more. Investors and borrowers could avoid this uncertainty if long-term indexed
bonds were available.
Panels B and C of Table 3 show that there has been some change in the behavior of real
and nominal interest rates over time. In the first subsample, from the early 1950s through
the early 1970s, real interest rates were comparatively stable. Hence the yields and returns
on hypothetical indexed bills and bonds have much smaller standard deviations in columns
(1), (3), (4), and (6) of panel B. There was also somewhat less inflation uncertainty, as
shown in columns (2) and (5). The second subsample, covering the last 20 years, has higher
inflation uncertainty and dramatically higher variation of hypothetical bond yields at all
maturities.
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3.2. Indexed Bond Yields in the United Kingdom
The validity of the numbers reported in Table 3 depends critically on the assumptions
we have made. In particular, the risk premia of 3-month nominal Treasury bills over 3month indexed Treasury bills, and of long-term indexed bonds over 3-month indexed
Treasury bills, must be constant. As a check on the reasonableness of these assumptions,
we apply the same methodology to UK data. Since indexed bonds are traded in the UK, we
can compare our hypothetical UK indexed bond yields to actual UK indexed bond yields.
Table 4 has exactly the same structure and sample period as Table 3 but is based on UK
rather than US data. We use the discount rate on 91-day government bills as our 3-month
interest rate (although this market is considerably less liquid than the Treasury bill market
in the US), and we measure UK inflation using the Retail Price Index. The table shows that
both inflation uncertainty and the variability of the real interest rate have been much higher
in the UK than in the US.
Table 5 compares the hypothetical indexed bond yields constructed in Table 4 with
indexed bond yields constructed from quoted prices of UK index-linked gilts over the period
1985-94.
The analysis of UK data is complicated by the fact that UK indexed bonds are not
perfectly indexed, but have an 8-month indexation lag. This means that inflation in the last
8 months before each payment erodes the real value of the payment, so that UK indexed
bond yields contain a nominal component. Barr and Campbell (1995) correct for this and
calculate implied yields on zero-coupon nominal and perfectly indexed bonds in the UK
over the period 1985-94. We use their implied indexed yields for the comparison in Table 5.
For each VAR specification, sample period, and bond maturity, Table 5 first compares
the moments of hypothetical and actual indexed bond yields. The table reports the ratio of
the mean hypothetical yield to the mean actual yield, the ratio of the standard deviation of
the hypothetical yield to the standard deviation of the actual yield, and the correlation
between the hypothetical and actual yields. Then the table reports the same moments for
quarterly returns on hypothetical and actual indexed bonds.
The mean ratios tend to be greater than one at short maturities, and less than one at long
maturities, indicating that our hypothetical indexed yield curve is flatter on average than the
actual yield curve. This result should not be surprising, since our procedure for constructing
hypothetical yields sets all term premia to zero; if there are constant positive term premia
on longer-term bonds our hypothetical yield curve will tend to be too flat.
For our purposes it is more important to capture the dynamics of indexed bond yields.
At horizons of 1 or 2 years our VAR model seems to do quite well; in the 1-lag VAR model
estimated over the full sample the standard deviation ratio is 0.59 for 1-year bond yields and
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0.68 for 2-year bond yields, while the correlation is 0.63 for 1-year bond yields and 0.46 for
2-year bond yields. These numbers indicate that the VAR model understates the variability
of actual 1- and 2-year indexed bond yields. Turning to indexed bond returns, the
correlations are not as high but the standard deviation ratios are closer to one. A visual
impression of these results is given in Figures 3 and 4, which plot the actual and
hypothetical 1-year and 2-year indexed bond yields over the 1985-94 period.
At longer horizons, the variability of both hypothetical and actual indexed bond yields
decline; in the 1-lag VAR model estimated over the full sample these declines match each
other so the standard deviation ratio is roughly constant. The remaining movements of the
actual long-term indexed bond yield are poorly explained by our VAR model.
3.3. Tax Issues
3.3.1. The after-tax real interest rate
So far we have measured real interest rates on a pre-tax basis, and have calculated the
pre-tax indexed bond yields that would equate pre-tax returns on indexed bonds of all
maturities to the pre-tax return on nominal 3-month Treasury bills. But these calculations
can also be done on an after-tax basis. The after-tax real interest rate is the nominal interest
rate times one minus the tax rate, less the inflation rate, since nominal interest payments are
fully taxable in the US. Table 6 calculates the after-tax indexed bond yields that would
equate the after-tax returns on indexed bonds with the after-tax real interest rate. The table
assumes a constant tax rate of 0.3. We get results that are qualitatively very similar to those
in Table 3. The tax correction reduces the average level of the real interest rate and of
indexed bond yields, but has only minor effects on their movements through time.14
3.3.2 How should indexed bonds be taxed?
It is also important to consider how indexed bonds would be taxed in the US. This is
a serious practical issue that, if not handled correctly, may be an obstacle to the effective
issuance of government debt that promises a stable real cash flow.15 In the United Kingdom,
the capital gain component of the return on gilts is not taxed, and so the nominal capital
gains caused by the inflation adjustment of principal for index-linked gilts are not taxed.
This gives index-linked gilts a tax advantage relative to nominal gilts, more of whose return

14

Given these results, and the fact that Wilcox and Zervos (1994) find very low breakeven tax
rates in the UK, we do not report after-tax results for the UK.
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Some former obstacles to issuance of indexed bonds in US Federal law and in the tax code have
disappeared, see McCulloch (1980), Hochman and Palmon (1988), and Knoll (1991).
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comes in the form of taxable coupon payments.16 US Treasury officials have thought that,
so long as our tax system is not indexed to inflation, the US must not offer such a subsidy,
and should tax each year the inflation-induced increase in value of the principal as income.
Note that so long as the Treasury takes such a position, then they are ruling out the issuance
of bonds whose after-tax cash flow is immune from disturbances due to inflation. Should
there be a dramatic inflation, then there would be dramatic tax effects on the real wealth of
investors in indexed bonds. If there were unexpected very high inflation in the US, then
under present US tax law, all taxable investors in indexed bonds would see a real one-year
after-tax return on their investment each year equal to minus the highest tax bracket. A
succession of such years would arbitrarily do great damage to the net worth of investors. If
the taxation on the inflation-induced increase in principal were deferred until a later date,
as would be possible for investors with tax-deferred retirement accounts, the tax effect on
real values would not be so dramatic, but might still be very important if inflation becomes
high. This sensitivity of after-tax returns to inflation is troubling because it undercuts the
constancy of real cash flow that is the chief attraction of indexed debt.
The ideal solution to this tax problem would be to inflation-index the entire tax system,
and not tax the inflation component of any returns. This ideal solution does not appear to
be in the cards, however. An alternative solution would be for the government to create
bonds whose adjustment of payouts to inflation more than compensates for inflation, so that
the after-tax payouts are stabilized for certain tax brackets. But the easiest solution would
be to follow the British example and make the inflation component of the returns tax free.
There is nothing unfair to other tax payers implicit in this solution; the market would price
the bonds on the date of issue higher because of the tax subsidy.17
Making the payouts on the bonds tax free would also solve another nuisance problem
with indexed bonds whose entire payout is taxable. If the inflation-induced increase in
principal of bonds were taxable each year, then there would be taxes to be paid on income
that is not yet received. The taxes owed could even exceed the coupon income from the
bonds, putting some bond holders in a situation where they were unable to pay their taxes
without selling some of their indexed bonds, incurring transactions costs and facing
difficulties to do with the lumpiness of the bonds.
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This description of the UK tax regime is accurate through 1995, but changes in 1996 will alter
the tax treatment of both nominal and index-linked gilts.
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There might be some revenue cost to the exemption if the tax bracket of the average bondholder
is higher than the tax bracket of the marginal bondholder who determines the market price of the
bonds.
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4. How Would the Issue of Indexed Debt Affect
Treasury Borrowing Costs?
4.1. Is There Public Demand for Indexed Debt?
A direct objection to the issuance of indexed debt is that the public is not interested in
it except in times of hyperinflation; only economists seem to want indexed bonds. There is
a popular joke that if the US Treasury is asked to issue indexed debt, then they should mail
prospectuses to members of the American Economic Association. If indexed bonds are such
a good idea for the general public, why haven’t they taken root from private issuance of such
bonds in the century and a half since they were first vigorously advocated?
The US Treasury has been alert to possible new markets as suggested by privatelycreated products. For example, in 1982, several investment bankers started marketing zerocoupon securities derived from coupon-bearing government bonds; these were called TIGRs
(Treasury Investment Growth Receipts) by Merrill Lynch and CATS (Certificates of
Accrual on Treasury Securities) by Salomon Brothers. The success of these privatelycreated instruments led the Treasury to issue their own zero-coupon bonds, called Treasury
Strips. Thus, the Treasury followed up quickly on a new product idea whose value had been
demonstrated in the private market. In contrast, there is no recent US example of private
sector issuance of indexed debt for the Treasury to follow.
Even the markets for indexed debt in foreign countries are regarded by some as not
obvious success stories, except for those issued in times when inflation was out of control.
Some argue that the index-linked gilts issued in the UK are not evidence of the success of
indexed bonds, because the UK government provides a tax subsidy in the form of zero
taxation of the inflation-induced increase in the nominal principal. This gives index-linked
gilts a tax advantage over conventional gilts with the same real yield. A substantial
proportion of index linked gilts, especially those whose maturity is relatively short, are held
by taxable investors. Because of the tax subsidy, the government is able to sell index-linked
gilts successfully without having to offer a very low price and high yield. By this argument,
the tax subsidy is a less visible government subsidy than high indexed bond taxable yields
would be; the high yields would reveal how unsuccessful these bonds really are and so
might invite criticism.
The ability of the Treasury to issue indexed debt is in some sense open to question. The
issue may “fail” if there is not enough investor interest; for example, an attempted issuance
of indexed bonds in Italy in 1983 was widely described as having failed; see Penati et al.
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(1995).18 What can it mean when people say that a government issue of indexed bonds has
failed? The usual stories of selection bias that explain why individuals or firms may be
unable to borrow at any interest rate, as for example in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), do not
seem to apply when the borrower is national government and the lenders are its people. A
statement that an issue has failed apparently should be interpreted as a discovery that the
real yield that would be necessary to sell the issue is very high, so that the issue can be sold
only with a government subsidy that is judged as flagrantly high.
We are not inclined to use the word “success” or “failure” when describing attempts to
issue new instruments. In any event, we believe that the amount of subsidy implicit in real
yields and tax advantages in the UK case and in other low inflation countries has not been
“flagrant.” Still, there is a question why indexed bonds have not appeared privately in this
country. There appears to be no clear understanding why the public is not more interested
in buying indexed bonds.
One argument, advanced by Irving Fisher (1928), is that people are subject to “money
illusion”; they are accustomed to thinking of money as a standard of value, and do not trust
indexation schemes. There is indeed some evidence that people are vulnerable to some
illusions and confusions regarding the price level, see Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1994)
or Shiller (1996). However, these public errors in thinking are probably not immutable, and
if there were wider publicity given to the advantages of indexed debt, then we would expect
many people to learn that investing in indexed debt is a wise thing. We proceed with this
paper under the assumption that people would behave rationally in connection with these
markets if they were firmly established as investment vehicles and viewed as liquid
investments.
There is another interpretation of money illusion, that it occurs mostly in low inflation
environments, and there because with low inflation most people do not see the benefit of
taking the trouble to understand and deal with low inflation. There is plenty of evidence that
when inflation becomes substantial people do take the trouble, and money illusion withers;
note the prevalence of indexation in hyperinflation countries. Indeed, even in the moderately
high inflation period in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were clear
signs that private indexation schemes were getting established, and one might well suspect
that these would have succeeded better had the inflation continued or worsened.
In 1979, the Timbers Corp, a New York real estate development company, made
inflation-indexed mortgages available in Westchester County New York, and they followed
this up later in Atlanta Georgia. Shortly thereafter, the Utah State Retirement System began
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slow August market.
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an inflation-indexed mortgage program. In 1982, the Real Dollar Corporation sought
approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission to sell indexed bonds to provide
funds for indexed mortgages. At this time, the Fund for an Open Society, a nonprofit
Philadelphia mortgage company, approved a plan for an indexed bond and an indexed
mortgage program. In 1982 the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Development held hearings on plans for indexed mortgages. Proponents of inflation-indexed
mortgages urged Congress to pass legislation overriding state laws prohibiting negative
nominal amortization in mortgages, which was an obstacle to widespread issuance of
inflation-indexed mortgages. Around this time there were also some unusual schemes
related to indexed bonds; for example, in 1980 the Sunshine Mining Company issued $30
million of bonds indexed to the price of silver.
All of this interest in indexed bonds dried up when the inflation rate came down
dramatically, following the Fed’s new restrictive monetary policy and the great recession
of 1981–2. The powerful impetus to indexation caused by seeing dramatic changes in real
values due to inflation was gone. The fundamental wisdom of indexed bonds remains,
however, as valid as ever. With long-term bonds, there is never assurance that a high
inflation episode like that of the late 70s and early 80s will not return. It should be possible
now to remind people of this possibility, and rekindle the interest that was once shown in
these indexed bonds.
4.1.1. Balkanization
An important argument that the US Treasury raises against issuance of government debt
is that it will balkanize the Treasury bond market, and thereby increase the cost of
borrowing. That the issuance of indexed debt might do this appears to be a matter of
conviction to some Treasury officials, and so we should take it seriously.
It is conceivable that the market could react in a negative way to all US debt if it
perceives that the Treasury will reduce the liquidity of its debt by creating too many
categories of debt. By launching a single new indexed bond issue, the Treasury could
engender fears that there will be many more such issues in the future, thereby creating fears
of diminished future liquidity.
But we find it hard to understand why such balkanization costs are expected to be very
large. The Treasury already has issued many different kinds of debt in terms of maturity and
coupon, and the introduction of Treasury strips was a major innovation. In fact, there is
perhaps reason to think that the balkanization costs are negative: so long as there is some
clientele who are interested in indexed bonds, then the optimal thing to do, from a borrowing
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cost perspective, is to satisfy this clientele.19 Even if money illusion is widespread, and
accounts for widespread public disinterest in indexed bonds, there would still appear to be
money to be made in issuing indexed bonds for those people who are not stymied by money
illusion. Surely, there must be many people (and not just members of the American
Economic Association) who are aware of the importance of inflation uncertainty in nominal
contracts.20
4.2. How Large is the Inflation Risk Premium?
Opposing these alleged costs to the government’s issuance of indexed debt, there is the
possible advantage of eliminating the cost to the government of paying the inflation risk
premium on its debt. Although we have noted above that we doubt that the size of the
inflation risk premium should be a critical issue in deciding whether to issue indexed bonds,
we will provide here some estimates of its magnitude.
There are two ways to estimate the size of the inflation risk premium, defined as the
average excess return on an inflation-sensitive asset (say a nominal 5-year zero-coupon
bond) that is attributable to its inflation sensitivity. First, we can assume that the average
excess return on a nominal 5-year bond is entirely accounted for by its inflation risk
premium, and we can compare the average return or yield on the bond with the average
return or yield on a comparatively riskless asset such as a nominal 3-month Treasury bill.
Second, we can use finance theory and try to calculate the risk premium that would be
justified by the covariance of the return on the nominal 5-year bond with relevant state
variables. In order to isolate the inflation-related component of this risk premium, we can
compare the theoretical risk premium for a nominal 5-year bond with the theoretical risk
premium for a hypothetical indexed 5-year bond.
4.2.1. Direct estimates from average bond returns
To apply the first method, we use Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data
on nominal zero-coupon bond yields over the period 1953–94. The yields are available up
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in the US Treasury bond market is only about 10 basis points, although it is as much as 70 basis
points in the Japanese government bond market. This liquidity premium is small relative to plausible
estimates of the inflation risk premium.
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Treasury officials however stress the great cost to them, in terms of legal costs, arriving at
decisions about the kinds of indexed bonds to issue, and changing of computer and administrative
systems, to issuing indexed bonds. Possibly the greatest cost is the cost in terms of time and attention
to high Treasury officials who have many other pressing issues to consider.
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to a maturity of 5 years; they are calculated from the prices of coupon-bearing bonds using
a methodology explained by Fama and Bliss (1987).21
Table 7 reports summary statistics on nominal bond yields of maturities 1, 2, and 5
years. Panel A covers the whole sample period, 1953–94, while panels B and C cover the
two subsamples 1953–73 and 1974–94. For each bond and sample period, the table reports
the average excess return over a nominal 3-month Treasury bill, the average change in the
yield, and the average yield spread over a nominal 3-month Treasury bill. Standard
deviations of each variable are reported in parentheses. The units for the table are again
annualized percentage points.
The risk premium on a nominal bond can be computed either from its average excess
return or from its average yield spread. If one assumes that changes in nominal interest rates
have an unconditional mean of zero, then the unconditional mean of the excess return should
equal the unconditional mean yield spread.
Over the full sample period 1953–94, the two averages are indeed quite close and
suggest a risk premium of 70 to 100 basis points on 5-year nominal bonds. In finite samples,
of course, these two averages can differ. The finite-sample average excess return will be a
downward-biased estimate of the risk premium in a sample where there have been positive
surprises in nominal interest rates on average, while the finite-sample yield spread will be
an upward-biased estimate of the risk premium in a sample where there have been positive
anticipated increases in nominal interest rates on average. The period 1953–73 is an
example where this appears to be important; the average yield spread on nominal 5-year
zero-coupon bonds exceeds the average return on these bonds by more than 80 basis points.
The instability across subsamples in Table 7 suggests that one should be cautious of
empirical results generated from short samples. This point comes out even more clearly
when one looks at the UK experience with indexed bonds. During the period 1983–94, Barr
and Campbell (1995) show that the average returns on UK nominal bonds were almost 500
basis points above the average returns on perfectly indexed bonds. However this is not a
reliable guide to the inflation risk premium because the sample is a short one — the 500
basis point excess return is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level — and an
atypical one dominated by unexpected declines in inflation. When inflation unexpectedly
declines, nominal bondholders enjoy windfall gains that are not available to indexed
bondholders, but these should not be used to estimate the inflation risk premium.
Evidence from longer sample periods can also be informative. Siegel (1994, Tables 1-1
and 1-2) reports that long-term nominal government bonds delivered a geometric average
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real return of 3.4% over the period 1802–1992, as compared with 2.9% for short-term
nominal government debt and 6.7% for a broad index of common stocks. This implies a
rather low risk premium on nominal bonds of only 0.5%. This finding is not driven by the
inflation experience of the period since World War II, for the average long bond premium
over short debt is –0.3% in the period 1802–1870, 0.5% in the period 1871–1925, and 1.2%
in the period 1926–1992.
4.2.2. Indirect estimates from covariances
We now turn to our second method for estimating the inflation risk premium. We use
asset pricing theory to try to judge what risk premium is implied by the covariances of bond
returns with relevant state variables. We use two state variables: the return on a proxy for
the market portfolio, as suggested by the traditional CAPM, and the growth rate of aggregate
consumption, as suggested by the consumption CAPM.22 While there are of course many
empirical deficiencies in both forms of the CAPM, most of these concern the cross-sectional
pattern of returns on stock portfolios as documented by Fama and French (1992) and others;
even if the CAPM fails in this respect it may still explain the pattern of returns across broad
classes of assets.
Some tricky empirical issues arise in implementing the traditional CAPM and the
consumption CAPM. In the traditional CAPM, it is conventional to use a value-weighted
stock index as a proxy for the market. We follow this convention in the first row of Table
8, but in the second row we also consider a broader proxy for the market portfolio
constructed as 0.5 times the value-weighted stock index plus 0.5 times the return on a
nominal 5-year zero-coupon bond. This weighting scheme was suggested by calculations
of the ratio of corporate equity to corporate equity plus corporate bonds plus government
bonds in the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Balance Sheets for the US Economy. This
ratio was close to 0.5 on average in our full sample and both subsamples.
In the consumption CAPM, problems are caused by the fact that consumption is
measured as a quarterly flow, so empirical researchers must decide whether to identify
consumption in a given quarter as beginning-of-quarter or end-of-quarter consumption. If
consumption is beginning-of-quarter, then asset returns measured over quarter t should be
regressed on consumption growth from quarter t to t+1 (we call this the “lead” assumption);
if consumption is end-of-quarter, then consumption growth from quarter t-1 to t should be
used (we call this the “lag” assumption).
Table 8 reports the betas of nominal zero-coupon bond returns with the return on a
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the multiple factors suggested by the Merton (1973) intertemporal asset pricing model.

22

value-weighted stock index, the broader proxy for the market portfolio, “lagged”
consumption growth, and “led” consumption growth. Correlation coefficients are also
reported in parentheses. For comparison, the beta and correlation coefficients with
consumption are reported for the value-weighted stock index.
The table shows that nominal bonds tend to have rather small betas on the state variables
that determine risk premia. The stock market beta of a nominal 5-year zero-coupon bond
in the period 1953–94 is only 0.1, implying a risk premium of 0.1 times the equity premium
or about 60 basis points. The beta of the same bond on the broader market proxy is 0.4,
compared with a stock beta of 1.6; this implies a risk premium of 0.4/1.6 = 0.25 times the
equity premium or about 150 basis points. The “lag” consumption beta of the bond is
actually negative, implying a negative risk premium, but this may merely indicate the
inappropriateness of this timing assumption. The “lead” consumption beta is 0.6, as
compared with a stock market “lead” consumption beta of 4.0. The implied risk premium
for the bond is 0.6/4.0 = 0.15 times the equity premium or about 90 basis points. It is
comforting that these risk premium estimates are fairly similar to each other and to the direct
estimates in Table 7.
Interestingly, all the betas for nominal bonds are considerably higher in the last 20 years
of the full sample than in the first 20 years. This may help to explain the increase in yield
spreads and average excess returns on nominal bonds in the more recent period.
For comparison, Table 8 also shows betas and correlations for the hypothetical indexed
bond returns that were described in Table 3. The indexed bonds always have negative
market and consumption betas (although the stock market betas in particular are extremely
small). This implies that indexed bonds would have small negative risk premia rather than
the positive risk premia found for nominal bonds.
Longer-run evidence on bond risk premia has been reported by Breeden, Gibbons, and
Litzenberger (1989), who study the period 1926–82. They estimate consumption betas
indirectly by calculating betas with the “maximum correlation portfolio”, the portfolio of
assets that is maximally correlated with consumption growth. The consumption beta for
bonds is 0.05 times the consumption beta for stocks, suggesting an inflation risk premium
of only 20 or 30 basis points. Since changes in monetary policy have tended to increase
inflation risk in the postwar period, it is not surprising that inflation risk premia should be
smaller over the period studied by these authors.
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that there is a modest positive inflation
risk premium in the returns on long-term nominal debt. A best guess might be 50 to 100
basis points for a 5-year zero-coupon nominal bond. This implies that there could be
nontrivial savings to the Treasury from reducing its issuance of long-term nominal debt.
Long-term indexed debt, on the other hand, does not seem likely to have a large risk
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premium and might even have a negative risk premium. The main distinction between longterm indexed and short-term nominal debt has to do with return volatility at different
horizons, as discussed in the previous section, rather than with the average levels of returns.

5. Indexed Bonds and Monetary Policy
Indexed bonds play an informational role by revealing the term structure of forward
inflation rates. If the inflation risk premium is fairly stable, this reveals information about
the market’s expectations of future inflation. This can help the monetary authority judge
the credibility of its anti-inflationary policy. In this section we ask how indexed bond yields
might be used to help forecast inflation.
If we had both nominal and indexed bonds for all maturities out to some maximum
maturity, say thirty years, then there would be, implicit in their yields, market forecasts of
inflation for all forecast horizons out to the maximum, and also, forecasts of inflation for
each year out to the maximum maturity. Professional forecasters do not routinely produce
forecasts in such detail and for such horizons. When there is a market for both indexed and
nominal debt, then there is a serious incentive for individuals to try to forecast inflation in
such detail, and so we would expect that considerable effort would be expended in doing so.
To the extent that markets are efficient, one would expect that the bond-market inflation
forecasts might be much better than the professional forecasts we now have.
In assessing this argument it should be remembered that the profit opportunity available
to traders in indexed and nominal bonds who can better forecast inflation is not a risk-free
one. We are not talking about a riskless profit opportunity if the inflation expectations
implicit in the yields are biased. Thus, there may be considerable play in the relation
between optimal forecasts of inflation and market forecasts of inflation.
There is another concern with interpreting inflationary expectations implicit in the
nominal and indexed bond yields: the spread can be influenced by considerations of tax
law, both current, and expected future. The Darby–Feldstein hypothesis (Darby 1975,
Feldstein 1983) asserts that nominal bond yields equal a fixed real rate plus the expected
inflation rate divided by one minus the marginal tax rate. The validity of this hypothesis is
somewhat clouded by the complexities of the tax system and, moreover, there are multiple
tax brackets. Even if the situation were clear with regard to the current tax system, longterm bond yields would be influenced not only by the current tax system, but also by
expected future tax systems. For example, it is conceivable that taxation of nominal bonds
might one day exclude the inflation component of the interest; nominal bond yields ought
to vary through time in response to changes in the probability of such an exclusion.
One should also worry that the inflation risk premium may not be constant through
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time, and thus that the implicit inflationary expectations derived by comparing nominal and
indexed bond yields are invalid. The inflation risk premium might well vary through time
systematically, as public attitudes towards indexed and nominal debt change, and as the
public becomes more accustomed to indexed debt. Moreover, the government might be able
to influence this risk premium by changing the amount of indexed bonds that it issues. For
example, if the government were to issue an excessive quantity of indexed bonds it might
not obtain a good price for them, and so the yield on indexed debt would rise, thereby
depressing the implied inflation risk premium. What actually happens with the inflation risk
premium would seem to be intimately tied up with the government’s policy.23
To document how useful indexed bond yields might be in forecasting inflation, in the
idealized world of our econometric model, we compare US nominal bond yields with
hypothetical expected inflation rates (the difference between nominal bond yields and
hypothetical indexed bond yields) as forecasters of inflation. We regress the annualized
inflation rate at horizons of 1, 2, and 5 years on the corresponding nominal bond yield and
hypothetical expected inflation rate. Table 9 reports the regression coefficients and R2
statistics from these regressions under the heading “Levels”. Under the heading
“Differences,” the table also reports the coefficients and R2 statistics from regressions that
subtract the inflation rate over the last year from both the regressor and the dependent
variable. This transformation helps to ensure that all the variables in the regression are
stationary.
We find that at every horizon and sample period, the hypothetical expected inflation rate
is a better forecaster of inflation than is the nominal bond yield, in the sense that the
regression coefficients are closer to their theoretical value of unity. Over the full sample
period 1953–94 the R2 statistic is also about twice as high for the hypothetical expected
inflation rate, although the results are more erratic in the subsamples.
These results suggest that the Federal Reserve should not simply use nominal bond
yields as forecasters of inflation, but should take other variables (specifically, the variables
used in our VAR system) into account. While in principle the Federal Reserve can do this
econometrically, as we have done in this paper, there would be practical and political
advantages to having a market-based forecast based on nominal and indexed government
bond yields. Even if the market-based forecast were subject to some of the biases we have
discussed above, it may be that changes in the market-based forecast are recognized by the
public as useful information about the changed outlook for inflation.
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Sir Alan Walters, in discussing the UK experience with index-linked gilts, stressed that the
government should be able to influence inflation expectations implicit in bond yields, in testimony
before the Subcommittee on Trade, Productivity, and Economic Growth of the Joint Economic
Committee, May 14, 1985, page 38.
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These advantages are well illustrated by the experience of the UK. The Bank of
England uses the nominal and index-linked UK government yield curves to construct a term
structure of forward inflation rates; since May 1993 the Bank has reported this term
structure in its Quarterly Inflation Report, and uses it to judge the medium- and long-term
prospects for inflation.24 This procedure gives the Governor of the Bank some independent
evidence of inflation prospects to use in his regular discussions with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer about the appropriate stance of monetary policy.

6. Conclusion
We conclude by considering, in a more speculative manner, some possible subsidiary
benefits of creating indexed government debt. These are benefits that are caused by private
sector adoption of indexed contracts spurred by the demonstration of indexing by the federal
government.
It is widely acknowledged that the proper role of the government is to provide public
goods, and the demonstration by example of the potential for new financial markets and
instruments is really a public good. The private sector tends to undersupply new financial
instruments, particularly at the retail level where marketing costs are much larger than in
wholesale financial markets. Any firm which took on the public relations effort needed to
first issue private indexed bonds would not be able to appropriate much of the societal
benefits to doing so. If indeed there is today a slowness to adopt indexing methods, because
of a general feeling that these methods have not been proven or have not met the test of time
and practice, then a demonstration by the federal government of the potential for various
forms of indexing may be highly productive.
If the US government were successful in creating a large, liquid market for indexed
government debt today, then it would possibly become, given the leadership role this
country has had in the past, a model for indexation the world over. The effect could be to
help educate the public about the importance of indexing, and to stimulate many other forms
of indexation.
To illustrate the importance of this, consider the effects of indexation of private
retirement annuities and long-term residential mortgages. If private retirement annuities
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Breedon (1995) and Deacon and Derry (1995) explain the technical details of the Bank’s
approach. King (1995) argues that the term structure of forward inflation rates provides a measure
of the credibility of official inflation targets. Barr and Campbell (1995) present evidence that forward
inflation rates do provide better inflation forecasts than nominal bond yields over the 1985–94 period
in the UK.
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were indexed to inflation, we would not have seen the impoverishment of many elderly, who
chose a fixed nominal payment stream. If long-term mortgages were indexed to inflation,
we would not have seen the tremendous redistribution of wealth towards homeowners that
occurred in the United States during the inflation of the last twenty years. Nominal
mortgages with prepayment options protect borrowers from declines in inflation (since they
can refinance their mortgages if nominal interest rates fall); but they offer borrowers the
potential for large gains if inflation rises. The cost of this option is substantial, perhaps as
much as 125 basis points in the mortgage interest rate.25 Indexed mortgages could be issued
with prepayment options, but the comparative stability of real interest rates would make the
prepayment options much less valuable and this would reduce the interest rates on indexed
mortgages.
Another possible effect of more widespread understanding of indexation might be an
increased public willingness to make all manner of longer-term contracts. There are today
many contracts that might be made more usefully if there were a possibility of making them
sensibly, in terms of real cash flows. It is impossible for us to predict the potential variety
of long-term contracts that might prove to be economically efficient if there were a popular
understanding of the possibility of couching their definition in inflation-indexed terms.
If the benefits of indexation were more widely appreciated, then the chances that our tax
system could be indexed to inflation would probably be improved. The benefits of having
a tax system indexed to inflation are very significant, see for example Feldstein (1983).
There is some reason to worry that government issuance of indexed debt may not have
much of a demonstration effect. Certainly, there has not been much private issuance of
indexed debt in the United Kingdom or in other moderate inflation countries where
government indexed debt has been introduced. But one should not assume that this failure
of the public to follow the government’s example that we see in the United Kingdom is
inevitable. Bootle (1991) argued that a large part of the reason for the failure of many
private firms in the UK to issue indexed debt is the UK tax law, which has “seemed vague
or penal or both.”26 Possibly a more important reason is just that opinion leaders have not
yet impressed on the public the importance of indexed private debt, to overcome their
habitual impulse to money illusion. History suggests that advances in public enlightenment
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At 1.30 pm on February 1, 1996, a newly issued 7% GNMA pass-through security traded at a
price of 101–11. Under Bloomberg median prepayment assumptions, the implied yield was 6.8% and
the duration was just over 6 years. At the same time a 6-year Treasury strip traded at a yield of 5.4%.
The spread of 140 basis points is mostly attributable to the prepayment option, since government
agency bonds trade at premiums to Treasury yields of only 20–25 basis points. Similar calculations
for a newly issued 7.5% GNMA pass-through give a spread of 170 basis points.
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are not easily generated, and may come long after the initial stimulus or only when
institutional circumstances are changed. If the United States were to issue indexed debt, the
public response might well be different.
There might also be some negative consequences of increased indexation of privatesector contracts. One common objection to the widespread indexation of the economy is
that indexation diminishes the incentives for the government to fight inflation. As this
argument goes, the people who are potentially most hurt by inflation will protect themselves
by indexation. The political forces to prevent inflation will then be weakened, and the large
number of people who are hurt somewhat by inflation, and who do not avail themselves of
protection via indexation, will find their interests harmed. A problem with this argument
is that the direction of the political effect of indexation is ambiguous; the political impact
of indexation may go the other way, along the lines argued by Margaret Thatcher.27
A related argument is that indexation of labor contracts may worsen problems caused
by the reluctance of workers to take wage cuts. If labor contracts are specified in nominal
terms, then inflation can reduce real wages without provoking worker resistance; this ceases
to be possible when labor contracts are indexed to the price level (Card and Hyslop 1996).
Although we appreciate the possibility of negative side-effects from indexation, we
believe that the importance of these should not be overstated. Although the theory of the
second-best tells us that the elimination of some distortions in the economy may worsen
other distortions and thereby indirectly reduce welfare, we find this to be unlikely in the
case of indexed bonds, where the direct benefits are so substantial.
The US Treasury officials who apparently have the authority to issue indexed bonds
may not see it as consistent with their primary mission to generate public goods by
promoting indexation in the economy. They should be urged to conceive of their mission
more broadly, and to get on with the creation of this important new kind of debt instrument.
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